



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

collision with the Roman curia ; and both, in preferring the documents to the biographers, fail to grasp the wholly altered worth given the latter by Villari's discovery of the earlier form and the contemporary sources of the so-called Burlamacchi.

That, in the search of truth, two scholars so severed by religious environment should have reached such agreement, in such a field, is one of the encouraging things of modern historical research ; and the generous policy of Pope Leo XIII. could hardly ask a better proof that the defenders of the church have nothing to fear. The real issue, so long obscured, is not one of fact, but of faith. It is to be regretted by students of church history that Professor Pastor has promised now to turn his attention to his continuation of Janssen. If, when he comes back to his own work, he can carry it through the yet more difficult period that next awaits him with the fairness of spirit and the unfailing courtesy which mark his volumes thus far, he will have earned as few others the gratitude of the Christian world.

GEORGE L. BURR.

*Calendar of State Papers, Spanish.* Vol. III., *Elizabeth (1580–1586)*. Edited by MARTIN A. S. HUME. (London : H.M. Stationery Office. 1896.)

THE material calendared in this volume is drawn mainly from the correspondence of Spanish agents in England, and other papers relating directly to English affairs, preserved in the Spanish Archives at Simancas. But a considerable number of the documents are from the Simancas papers removed to Paris by Napoleon during the Peninsular war. Students who have writhed under the inaccuracies of Spanish editors will be glad to know that Major Hume has carefully transcribed or collated all the documents in this volume, which includes all the Spanish State Papers touching the relations between England and Spain at a period when the history of either of these countries was the history of the world.

The opening pages usher us into a time of great anxiety for Elizabeth. Spanish dockyards were noisy with Philip's naval preparations. Both Spain and the Pope were giving the Irish rebels active support. Seminary priests and the other adherents of Mary Stuart were raising their heads all over England. The Queen's own popularity was suffering on account of the projected marriage with Alençon.

Orange, inflexible and unwavering, saw only one way to attract to the national cause the Catholic Flemings and Walloons ; namely, to call in Catholic Alençon to assume the sovereignty of the States. But Elizabeth was ready to sacrifice her last shilling and her last Englishman to prevent a French domination of Flanders. If Alençon went there at all, he must go under her patronage and with the support of the French Huguenots. Yet she durst not go so far as to drive the French king into the arms of Philip, and therefore beguiled Henry III. with the idea of his dynastic aggrandizement. A better understanding between England and France, and a re-

kindling of the smouldering troubles in Flanders, would best offset Philip's conquest of Portugal, which was now imminent. It was essential for Alençon to convince the Dutch that the Queen would certainly marry him and aid him in Flanders with all her power. He was dazzled by the brilliancy of the English match, and hoped against hope that she was in earnest. On the other hand, he durst not appear too easy in the matter of religion, for fear of alienating the Catholic Flemings and Walloons.

Such is the labyrinth out of which Major Hume's volume guides us. On page 4 of the *Calendar* is an important letter from Philip's ambassador in Paris, Vargas, which reveals a new element of intrigue against Elizabeth. Guise and Beaton had prevailed upon Mary Stuart "to place herself, her son, and her realm in the hands of his Catholic Majesty unreservedly." This meant the detachment of the Guises from French interests. Vargas jumped at the idea. "Such," he says, "is the present condition of England . . . that I really believe if so much as a cat moved, the whole affair would crumble down in three days." Philip answered that he would lovingly welcome the King of Scots to Spain and "treat him as his own son," not the happiest way of putting it so soon after Don Carlos's death. He also promised to help the Queen when the time arrived (p. 23). Mary Stuart did not realize that it was her own death which would make that time arrive. For it is doubtful whether Philip would ever have sent the Armada to place her, a Frenchwoman and a Guise, upon the throne of England. Her accession might easily have caused a union of England and France against Spain. Not till Philip could feel sure of conquering England for his own aggrandizement alone; not till Mary Stuart, having made him heir to her claims, had mounted the scaffold of Fotheringay, could he be whole-hearted in undertaking the invasion.

While Scottish Catholics, Guises, and Spaniards were intriguing to make Great Britain an appanage of Spain, humiliate France, and crush out Protestantism in the Low Countries, Mendoza, afterwards the greatest plotter of all, was warning Philip (p. 8) against the rapid growth of that sea power which was so soon to blast the hopes that had inspired, ever since Mary Stuart's flight to England, the great conspiracy of Catholic Europe. Drake's arrival at Plymouth with his rich spoils was almost simultaneous with the landing in Ireland of the Papal forces sent from Spain. During the rest of Mendoza's residence, Philip's aid to Elizabeth's rebels, and the attacks of the English upon Philip's ships and territory, were the ever-recurring subjects of complaint. The ambassador's relations to Queen and people grew daily more strained. While Drake was sunning himself in the royal favour, Mendoza was excluded from the Queen's presence, and had to vent his wrath in threats which he hoped would reach her ears. But Elizabeth and her ministers knew that Philip's hands were full in Portugal, and that he could not spare a man nor a ducat to hurt her.

Meanwhile, Alençon really frightened her by agreeing to all conditions for the match and asking her to set a day for the nuptials. She evaded him, however, and still the marriage negotiations went on. Philip naturally

feared they might lead to a formal alliance between England and France. For the adherents of Don Antonio, the Portuguese pretender, were trying to induce both Catherine de' Medici and Elizabeth to restore him to his throne; and about this time a party of Portuguese landed in England, amongst whom was a certain man "under the middle height, with a thin face, and very dark, his hair and beard somewhat grey, and his eyes green." This was Don Antonio himself. Mendoza complained, and Philip wrote to the Queen requesting his expulsion or surrender, but all to no purpose.

Meanwhile, Alençon, after his deplorable failure in Flanders, crossed to England, where Mendoza's swarming spies (more than one privy councillor was in his pay) brought him accurate information about Queen and lover. Through all the intricate and shifting phases of the negotiations, the Queen's object remained steadfast. In spite of kisses and rings, it was, as Mendoza told Philip, to avoid offending Alençon, and "to pledge him so deeply in the affairs of the Netherlands as to drive his brother into a rupture with your Majesty . . . while she keeps her hands free, and can stand by looking on at the war."

Mendoza met the Queen's attempts to secure an alliance with France against Spain by intriguing with the English and Scottish Catholics. He became the confidant of Mary Stuart, who wrote him (p. 215) that she was resolved "to follow as far as I can in the conduct of my affairs the wishes of my good brother, the King of Spain." She had already begged Philip for armed aid, and Mendoza strongly advised his master to send troops to Scotland. Granvella warmly seconded (p. 309) the ambassador's recommendation. When, however, Philip heard of the "Raid of Ruthven" and the flight of Lennox, he saw that the Scottish enterprise was hopeless for a time. Guise, too, thought immediate action in Scotland inadvisable, and informed Tassis that he was going to begin operations with the English Catholics. The Queen was first to be murdered, the country raised; Philip and the Pope must provide him at once with 100,000 crowns (pp. 464, 475, 479).

Elizabeth got wind of Guise's intrigues, and at once opened negotiations for the release of Mary Stuart. Mendoza was frightened. "Nothing could be more injurious to your Majesty's interests," he wrote (p. 465).

So soon as James extricated himself from the guardianship of the Scottish lords, Guise could hope for speedy success. His elaborate plan now provided for a co-operation of Spaniards and French with the English North Country and the Scottish Catholics of the borders. He averred that he undertook the enterprise only "to re-establish the Catholic religion in England, and to place the Queen of Scotland peacefully on the throne of England" (p. 806). And soon Guise performed a master-stroke, to which I would call especial attention. He persuaded the Scottish Catholic lords to offer Philip "one or two good ports in Scotland near the English border, to be used against the Queen of England" (p. 590). Mendoza hotly advocated the scheme in a remarkable state paper (p. 681) which he sent to the King. Too late Philip learned the meaning of the ambassador's

words: "In the event of the loss of a great fleet, the owner sees himself bereft at one blow." And certainly the lack of a good harbor was a chief element in the catastrophe of the Armada.

But Mary Stuart, who had for twenty years inspired the policy of Catholic Europe, knew (p. 663) that her remarkable career was over. And whether Philip admitted it to himself or no, he could but rejoice at her impending doom. It is possible that he might, as her heir, have brought himself to invade England and place her on the throne. His opportunity was good, but it wanted one thing to make it perfect, and that was the death of Mary, Queen of Scots.

For the special student of the sixteenth century, a recommendation of Major Hume's scholarly *Calendar* is superfluous. But I venture to say that all who love history will read with delight the brilliant essay which appears under the modest guise of an introduction to the present volume.

W. F. TILTON.

*The Courtships of Queen Elizabeth. A History of the Various Negotiations for Her Marriage.* By MARTIN A. S. HUME.  
(London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1896. Pp. 333.)

MAJOR HUME is well known as the scholarly editor of the *Calendar of Spanish State Papers (Elizabeth)*. His present work, a handsome volume, embellished with portraits and with designs from some of Queen Elizabeth's own books, is based on an overwhelming mass of original documents—French, English, Spanish, Venetian. While more than fulfilling in vivid picturesqueness the promise of its title, it is at the same time a masterly treatment of an unusually complicated period in the history of Europe. It is a book for all lovers of a well-told, romantic story, as well as for all students of the sixteenth century.

Until Elizabeth was fifty, there was no marriageable prince in Europe whom she had not considered as a possible consort. Though long after this age the vain old queen loved to simper at the lover's strain in which courtiers and foreign princes were cunning enough to address her, the present volume wisely deals only with those courtships which hide a deep political meaning, and reveal not only the queen's waywardness and fickleness as a woman, but also her astounding aptness in the political double-dealing of the time.

Philip the Second had been taught by his father to look upon marriage as the true way to add Great Britain to his empire. As Mary Tudor's husband he had been titular king, and was not ashamed to woo the daughter of Anne Boleyn, whose elevation to the throne had been such an outrage to the Spanish nation. Baffled in this suit, he continued to seek the aggrandizement of his house by attempting to procure Elizabeth's hand for one or another of the Hapsburg archdukes. But Elizabeth, pleased as she was personally by these flattering suggestions, knew that old Catholic Spain and youthful Protestant England could never be true allies. Her only disap-